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THEORY OF SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
RESEARCH: DEBATES AND A NOVEL VIEW 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Arguments derived from the theory of science have been present in strategic 
management discourse since at least the beginning of the 1970s. The field’s top-
journal, the Strategic Management Journal, has printed several theory of science-
based papers. Most positions in the theory of science (falsificationism, 
instrumentalism, realism, constructivism, etc.) have been present in the 
methodological discourse in the field. This chapter briefly reviews theory science 
applications to strategic management, before a distinctive perspective on the 
evolution of the strategic management field is developed. According to this 
perspective, science progresses when deeper level mechanisms are identified and 
theorized. Theoretical reduction may therefore be an independent criterion of 
scientific progress. Application to the strategic management field of this perspective, 
which in the social sciences is closely connected to the notion of methodological 
individualism, reveals that the field has evolved in a manner akin to a swinging 
pendulum, oscillating between micro and macro perspectives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management researchers are, as a rule, practically oriented folks who typically 
do not have much patience with lofty debates in the theory of science. Say the word 
“ontology” and you will have eyes rolling in the audience (yes, I have tried it!). Still, 
treating strategic management in a theory of science perspective actually goes back at least 
to Bowman (1974), and quite a number of papers on essentially philosophical issues in 
strategic management have been published in strategic management top journals, notably 
the Strategic Management Journal over the last two decades. Quite often ⎯ in fact, 
usually ⎯ these contributions mirror and apply established arguments in the theory of 
science literature, for example, work on the growth of knowledge (e.g., Camerer, 1985; 
Balakrishnan et al., 1989), constructivism versus realism (e.g., Smircich and Stubbard, 
1985), the role of unobservables (Godfrey and Hill, 1995), the rhetorical practice of 
strategic management scholars (Mahoney, 1993), so-called “critical theory” (e.g., Knights 
and Morgan, 1991; Alvesson and Willmott, 1995), and even “deconstruction” (Whipp, 
1996).   
Moreover, strategic management scholars are what be called “implicit theorists of 
science.” For example, they are intensely occupied with theoretical change in their field 
and with the reasons for such change (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1999), essentially 
methodological undertakings. In fact, the purpose of the highly influential bi-annual 
special issues of the Strategic Management Journal is not only to take stock on existing 
developments, but more importantly to signal major changes in the field. Scholars actively 
debate those changes, and often to do in what is essentially a philosophy of science mode. 
For example, they may debate whether the adoption by the strategic management 
community of certain core ideas (e.g., the RBV approach to competitive advantage) leads 
to a “loss of content” (Kuhn, 1970) (i.e., other ideas are forgotten – such as notions of 
positioning?). They may debate the relations between old and new strategy theories (e.g., 
rival or complementary; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Oliver, 1997; Foss, 1999). Or, they 
may issue the charge of tautology, a widespread practice in debate on the RBV (Porter, 
1991; Black and Boal, 1994; Priem and Butler, 2001; Powell, 2001).  
Clearly, all such discussions fundamentally touch on theory of science issues, as a 
traditional key concern of the theory of science has been the criteria that practising 
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scientists apply for the evaluation of theories and choice among rival theories. In this 
chapter I shall make reference to, and briefly review and discuss a subset of these 
discussions. However, the aim of the chapter goes further than reviewing existing 
contributions.  
Thus, I also discuss and draw attention to some more neglected (in the strategic 
management field) theory of science aspects of strategic management, notably 
mechanism-oriented explanation and the need for micro-foundations. These belong to the 
theory of science proper, because they touch on issues of how we grapple with social 
ontology through the modes of explanation we apply (see also Tsoukas and Knudsen, 
2002). Moreover, I shall argue that issues that relate to mechanisms and levels of analysis 
are among the reasons that scientists give and legitimately can give for rejecting or 
accepting theories. In fact, one can hold the view that scientific progress is the theoretical 
and empirical uncovering of the workings of the causal mechanisms that produce 
observable events (cf. Elster, 1989). One can go even further, and hold that such 
uncovering and theorizing of generative mechanisms usually entails reduction, that is, 
moving down the ladder of levels of analysis. In this view, which I shall state and defend, 
reduction is not simply a matter of explanation, but a distinct criterion for scientific 
progress. Whether strategic management has made scientific progress on this criterion is 
debatable. Specifically, I develop a variant of the “swinging pendulum” thesis of 
Hoskisson et al. (1999), and argue that strategic management research has oscillated 
between giving explanatory primacy to collective entities, or to micro-entities and their 
interaction.  The latter is, I argue, preferable.  
THE THEORY OF SCIENCE AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
The Theory of Science  
As a branch of epistemology, the theory of science has historically had a number of 
aims, although the priorities have changed quite dramatically, perhaps particularly over 
the last twenty years. A traditional aim has been to characterize science as a distinct field 
of inquiry, to describe the procedures that secure (if indeed they do) scientists privileged 
access to Nature’s Secrets, and to identify the criteria ⎯ such as potential falsifiability 
(Popper, 1934) ⎯ that may distinguish scientific from non-scientific arguments (i.e., the 
“demarcation problem”). A closely related activity has been the search for criteria of 
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scientific progress. Other traditional (that is, at least within the last hundred years) theory 
of science concerns have centered on the objectivity vs. theory-laden’ness of observations; 
the indeterminacy of theory under empirical testing (the Duhem-Quine thesis); induction 
versus falsification; the clash between scientific realism and instrumentalism; 
foundationalism vs scepticism; and, more recently, constructivism, issues of scientific 
open’ness, and the sociology and anthropology of science.  
As indicated in the Introduction, virtually all of these themes can be found ⎯ 
whether implicitly or explicitly ⎯ in the theory of science literature in strategic 
management. Overall, however, the theory of science themes that have made the most 
frequent appearances in the strategic management journals are those associated with the 
so-called “growth of knowledge” literature (Popper, 1934; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; 
Feyerabend 1974; Laudan, 1977). These have also been the most important inputs into 
theory of science-discussion in economics, perhaps the most important foundational 
discipline of the strategic management field. A brief review may therefore be in order.  
The Growth of Knowledge Literature  
The growth of knowledge literature is conventionally taken to begin with Popper 
(1934) and continue in his development of what he came to refer to as “critical 
rationalism,” an approach that fundamentally involved the idea that all knowledge is 
inherently conjectural (fallibilism) and cannot be verified by testing, only falsified. The 
growth of (scientific) knowledge entered the picture in Popper’s thinking from his 
wrestling with the problem of aligning fallibilism with the observed growth of knowledge.  
Popper’s solution to the problem was evolutionary epistemology, that is, the idea that the 
growth of knowledge may be explained making use of such fundamental evolutionary 
mechanisms as the variation-heredity-selection triad, corresponding to competiting 
conjectures, background knowledge (problem situations arise against background 
knowledge; conjectures that have withstood falsification attempts become part of 
background knowledge), and falsification leading to error elimination, respectively. 
Popper seems to have thought of this as a descriptive model of the growth of knowledge, 
although he was aware that his emphasis on bold conjectures (the variation mechanism in 
his evolutionary epistemology) was more normative than strictly descriptive.   
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In terms of the mechanisms underlying Popper’s evolutionary epistemology, Kuhn 
and Lakatos can be understood as de-emphasizing the variation and selection part in favor 
of strongly emphasizing the heredity part. Thus, both argued that individual theories are 
embedded in larger cognitive structures, the famous “paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970), that 
supplied large parts of the theoretical components of those individual theories. In fact, 
Kuhn rejected the idea that scientists pursue bold conjectures and attempt to falsify their 
theories. Lakatos is often portrayed as a sort of halfway house between Popper and Kuhn: 
While he adopted the paradigm idea, substantially refining it, he clearly admitted that 
falsification played a role.  
The important organizing category in Lakatos’ model is “the scientific research 
program”, which is clearly a more elaborate version of Kuhn’s concept of paradigm (and 
minus ideas on incommensurability).  Specifically, it should be thought of as a series of 
theories that comprise a continuous whole because they share some so-called “hard core 
propositions” and are constructed according to heuristics that are specific to the scientific 
research program. The research program changes by modifying propositions in the 
“protective belt” (the “positive heuristic” informs the researcher about how this should 
legitimately be done, and the negative heuristic informs him about what cannot 
legitimately be done), while keeping intact the hard core. As such, this is a descriptive 
model of scientific activity. However, Lakatos adds a normative dimension by introducing 
notions of progression and degeneration. In his scheme, scientific progress obtains if a 
new theory within a research program has “excess empirical content” in the sense that it 
puts forward some “novel fact”, some hitherto unnoticed prediction, which apparently 
(Lakatos is far from forthcoming here) should be understood as predicting novel 
phenomenon. Degenerating research programs are those that fail to develop novel facts 
and/or where theories belonging to the programme repeatedly are falsified.  
The Theory of Science in Economics 
In the social sciences, the growth of knowledge literature became particularly 
influential in economics, arguably the discipline that overall has influenced strategic 
management the most. Specifically, a watered down version of Popperian falsificationism 
in the guise of Friedman’s (1953) brand of instrumentalism became hugely influential in 
economics. The growth of knowledge literature became relatively influential in economics 
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in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programme proved influential.  
Thus, a cottage industry ⎯ now very much a sunset industry ⎯ that explored 
various changes in economic theory in analytical terms from the growth of knowledge 
literature developed in the 1980s (see Backhouse [1994] for a post mortem). Economic 
methodologists gradually realized that economists were not terribly scrupulous with 
respect to practising the falsificationism they hailed in their rhetorical practice. Whereas  
Blaug (1980) saw this as a problem for economists, increasingly it came to be seen as a 
problem for Popperian falsificationism. Similarly, it was found that it was quite hard to 
come up with convincing examples of Kuhnian revolutions or Lakatosian novel facts in 
economics (DeMarchi and Blaug, 1991; Backhouse, 1994; Foss, 1998).  
As a consequence, the focus began to shift to examining the actual practice of 
economists, that is, to those criteria that may be inferred through the actual choices that 
are being made in theory-building, and away from abstract and context-independent 
criteria for theory choice (e.g., Mäki, 1992). The wish to pass judgment on actual theory 
choice was also downplayed. Partly in parallel with this, the economics profession had a 
brief flirtation with rhetorical analysis, that is, the actual acts of persuasion that practising 
economists employ to convince their peers of the soundness of their arguments 
(McCloskey, 1983). And some of the reorientation away from the growth of knowledge 
literature took place in tandem with and to some extent inspired by currents in the 
sociology of science, notably the various (“strong”, “weak”) “programs” in the sociology 
of science (e.g., Bloor, 1976).1  
Theory of Science Debates in Strategic Management: Overall 
Strategic management is in a number of ways reminiscent of economics, not only 
because economics is an important foundational input in strategic management research, 
or because many strategic management scholars have an economics background, but also 
because strategic management seems to have gone through rather similar waves of 
methodological discussion and opinion. Thus, some of the first theory of science-based  
statements in strategic management were informed by arguments from the growth of 
                                                 
1 However, unlike the situation in many other social sciences, very few economists and economic 
methodologists have bought into the more extreme positions associated with the strong program in the 
sociology of science.   
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knowledge literature. Such statements were forcefully put forward by Camerer (1985) and 
Balakrishnan, Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1989), that is, strategy scholars strongly 
influenced by economics. In particular, these scholars criticized the lack of falsifiable 
analytical content in strategy content research. Growth of knowledge arguments continue 
to be invoked in methodological discourse in strategic management (e.g., Bogner et al., 
1998; Powell, 2001: 876).  
However, as is the case in the theory of science in general as well as in economics, 
initial enthusiasm with growth of knowledge philosophers has given way to more 
“pluralistic” positions (e.g., Bowman 1990). For example, the “rhetorical” approach of 
economic historian Donald (now Deirdre) MacCloskey (1983) was forcefully applied by 
Mahoney in a string of papers in the beginning of the 1990s (e.g., Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992; Mahoney, 1993).   
It is not difficult to see why strategic management scholars initially interested in 
growth of knowledge arguments may gradually have become somewhat uncomfortable 
with them. On the one hand, strategic management is a very strongly empirical field. 
Almost from the takeoff of strategic management as a scientific field (circa 1980 – i.e., 
the launch of the Strategic Management Journal and the publication of Porter, 1980)), the 
majority of researchers in their scientific practice conformed to the covering law approach 
to explanation and prediction (Hempel, 1965) and expressed a clear preference for the 
variable-centered (large-N) “variance approach” of empirical research practice rather than 
other (rigorous) approaches (e.g., Abell, 2001, 2004). Hypothesis formulation and testing 
in the context of large-N samples was, and is, the order of the day, and the vast majority of 
papers published in the leading journals that publish strategic management research take 
this approach. On the other hand, it also seems clear that most strategic management 
researchers do not follow falsificationism in the form espoused by Popper, but rather the 
“… statistical view of testing that accepts that neither refutation nor confirmation can ever 
be final, and that all we can hope to do is to discover on the basis of finite amounts of 
imperfect knowledge what is the balance of probabilities among existing hypotheses” 
(Lipsey, 1966: 184). Thus, strategic management research practice may not confirm to at 
least strict falsificationism.  
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Moreover, the Kuhnian and Lakatosian schema seem difficult to apply to a field that 
does not go back more than at most fifty years as even a practical field, and perhaps only 
about thirty years (or less) as a scientific field. It is not clear that there are in any 
meaningful sense Kuhnian paradigms or Lakatosian scientific research programmes in 
strategic management. In addition, it is unclear what are the Lakatosian “novel facts” in 
strategic management research (perhaps depending on how exactly that enigmatic concept 
is defined). To be sure, “competitive advantage,” whether sustained or not, hardly 
qualifies as a novel fact, as the recognition that some firms are more successful than others 
on a sustained basis certainly characterizes any strategy content approach, and indeed may 
be seen as the defining overall research question of the field.  
Recent Methodological Debate in Strategic Management 
What is here interpreted as a rejection of traditional growth of knowledge arguments 
by no means imply that strategic management scholars have given up on discourse that 
applies theory of science arguments. Strategic management scholars continue to 
vigorously debate methodological issues and the subject seems to have increased in 
popularity recently, as witnessed by the spate of methodological work that has appeared in 
the pages of the Strategic Management Journal over the last decade.  
Relative to earlier methodological pronouncements which tended to be relatively 
abstract and aloof, and mainly related to existing research practice in a highly critical 
manner (the high point of this is surely Camerer, 1985), recent methodological work tends 
to more explicitly relate to existing problems in strategic management research. For 
example, the advent and eventual dominance of the resource-based view raised a 
traditional problem in the theory of science ⎯ what is the explanatory role of 
unobservables? ⎯, as that view often emphasizes knowledge resources, and particularly 
tacit ones. Godfrey and Hill (1995) applied traditional philosophy positions (positivism 
and realism) to the debate, ultimately siding with the realist view that unobservables may 
be defended in terms of “inference to the best explanation” (i.e., abduction), in other 
words, a better performing (predicting) theory that involves unobservables is preferred on 
account of its superior performance (Lipton, 2004).  
Also reflecting the increased dominance of the resource-based view, Powell (2001) 
explored philosophical aspects of the link between sustained competitive advantage and 
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sustained financial performance that is foundational to the strategic management field.  He 
provocatively argued that 1) sustained competitive advantage is neither sufficient nor 
necessary to sustained financial superiority; 2) there is no contemporary falsifiable, 
unfalsified theory of sustained competitive advantage; and 3) discussion of competitive 
advantage is really a Wittgensteinian language game which, however, may be defended on 
pragmatist grounds for its usefulness to the strategic management field. Powell’s paper 
gave rise to two responses. Durand (2002: 868) took particular issue with Powell’s point 
1) and constructed an argument that “… competitive advantage is a sufficient but not-
necessary condition requiring a conjunctive factor, which is presumably organization.” 
Arend (2003: 281) admitted Powell’s point 2), but argued that even tautological and 
analytical propositions may be useful, because they supply “measures and laundry lists of 
possible manifestations of the elements of such propositions such as bargaining power, 
contracting costs, inimitability, and the like” that provide decision-makers with helpful 
categories with which to classify and arrange real phenomena.2  
On the whole, it is characteristic of recent theory of science-based discourse in 
strategic management that scholars, in contrast to earlier ambitious statements by Camerer 
(1985) and Balakrishnan et al. (1988), seem to have given up on putting forward strong 
recommendations for research practice, such as generally condemning research practice 
for its failure to cast reasoning in sufficiently analytical terms or to honor Popperian ideals 
of falsification. Instead, they are taken up with such issues as the logical structure of 
specific arguments in strategic management (e.g., Brønn, 1998; Powell, 2001) or whether 
the evolution of the field can be characterized as a move towards embracing more 
“organic” conceptions (Farjoun, 2002).  
There is a stronger descriptive than normative stance in recent contributions, and 
often a strong attempt to relate to actual research practice. To illustrate how far this can 
go, in a discussion of whether Kuhn’s paradigm development model applies to strategic 
management, Boyd et al. (2005) actually develop concrete measures that may allow for an 
                                                 
2 Another millennium debate was sparked by Mir and Watson (2000) arguing in favour of a constructivist 
approach (partially against the realism of Godfrey and Hill, 1995) to understanding the evolution of the 
strategic management field. Among other things, they took issue with the dominance of cross-sectional 
research methods in the field.  Kwan and Tsang (2001) argued that Mir and Watson had misconstrued 
realism. A reply by Mir and Watson (2001) upheld the constructivism/realism distinction. In contrast to the 
debate initiated by Powell (2001) the debate initiated by Mir and Watson touched more on philosophy than 
on strategic management.   
 10
assessment of the maturity of the strategic management field.3 This increased orientation 
to the actual research practice of the field may reflect the corresponding development of 
the theory of the science over the last decades. However, it may also reflects that strategic 
management is now more established in terms of research heuristics, and agreement on 
what are the key problems, the key variables and the key findings than it was in the 1980s 
(but see Mintzberg et al., 1998); accordingly, there may simply be less to criticize from a 
theory of science perspective.  
Still, there may be things left for the methodologist to normatively relate to. I 
propose in the following that one important way (certainly not the only one) in which 
strategic management progresses as a scientific field is by means of performing analytical 
reduction, that is, showing how phenomena on a given level of analysis is really 
constituted by the action and interaction of entities, ultimately human beings, at levels 
lower down. On this basis, it is possible, I argue, to pass (cautious) methodological 
judgment on the evolution of the field.  
A DIFFERENT VIEW: REDUCTION AS PROGRESS 
Of Reduction and Reductionism 
The notions of reduction and reductionism are highly context-dependent. 
Historically, these notions have been associated with more or less controversial positions 
such as mechanism, physicalism, and methodological individualism (Dupree, 1993; Jones, 
2000).  While the notions of reduction and reductionism, as they are used here, are closely 
related to methodological individualism, they have nothing to do with mechanism or 
physicalism. The aim is not to pursue the kind of charicature reductionism well known 
from debates in natural science:  
An extreme and classical kind of reductionism holds that all laws governing the 
behaviour of complex objects should be deducible from the laws of lower-level 
science and thus, ultimately, the laws of all sciences should be deducible from 
those of particle physics” (Dupré, 2001: 309).  
                                                 
3 Specifically, they “... conduct two studies. The first is a cross-discipline comparison of productivity norms 
for university faculty. The second study examines longitudinal research outcomes for a sample of 945 
strategy faculty. Our results indicate that strategy has the attributes of both an early stage and mature field: 
while overall research norms are low relative to other fields, they are driven far more by merit-based than 
non-merit factors” (2005: 841).  
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Applied to strategic management such a view would imply that competitive advantage be 
reduced to the genetic endowment of firm founders (and, indeed, ultimately to the laws of 
particle physics); most likely a pointless exercise. 
By “reduction,” then, is here understood the process of explaining a particular 
phenomenon in terms of more fundamental phenomena. By “reductionism” is here 
understood the explanatory position that the best understanding of a complex, and in 
social science: collective-level, phenomenon “… should be sought at the level of structure, 
behaviour and laws of its component parts plus their relations” (Silberstein, 2002: 81). It 
entails a search for the “deep structure” underneath aggregate phenomena (Williamson 
1996). While “reduction” is a description of an analytical operation, reductionism is a 
normative stance; it asserts that reduction is something worth striving for, and that science 
progresses when reductions are performed.  
Reductionism and Scientific Progress 
The argument here is that reduction is more than an analytical operation; it may 
constitute a criterion of scientific progress. On this criterion, a body of knowledge 
(whether a theory, research program, paradigm, research tradition, etc.) makes progress 
when a novel analytical reduction is performed. Such a “novel analytical reduction” takes 
place when one or more explanatory mechanisms, constructs, etc. that were hitherto 
treated in a blackbox manner are opened up and addressed in terms that are congenial to 
the other elements of the body of knowledge.  
Reductionism is a close allied of philosophical realism because it entails a sustained 
attempt to identify and theorize the real causal mechanisms ⎯ the “cogs and wheels” 
(Elster, 1989: 3) ⎯ that generate and explain observed associations between observed 
events (Harré, 1970; Bhaskar, 1978).4 It is, however, different from the covering-law 
model of explanation of Hempel and others, because the covering-law model does not 
imply an insistence on identifying causality.  
Now, whereas reductionism is naturally associated with philosophical realism, the 
reverse is not necessarily true: One can be a realist and hold that understanding “real 
causal mechanisms” requires doing the opposite of reduction. Some structuralist 
                                                 
4 On the role of mechanisms in explanation, see the essays in Hedström and Swedberg (1998). 
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sociologists may instantiate this position. In contrast, the reductionist position holds that 
the real causal mechanisms are usually located at the same or lower levels of analysis than 
the explanandum phenomenon, and that identifying and theorizing such mechanisms 
means scientific progress.5 There is a pragmatic dimension to this, because a better 
understanding of real generative mechanisms usually translates into better control (cf. 
Coleman, 1990: Chapter 1).     
Reductionism in this sense is not an extraneous criterion for scientific progress; it 
seems to be something that many practising social scientists subscribe to. This is 
particularly the case of economists (cf. also Mäki, 2001) and sociologists and political 
scientists who work from a rational choice basis. Thus, a massive research effort in 
economics over the last three decades has sought to understand aggregate phenomena, 
whether macro-economic outcomes or institutions, as the (possibily unintended) result of 
the interaction of rational individuals. The new institutional economics, contract theory, 
political economy, and a number of approaches in macro-economics (new classical as well 
as new Keynesian) are instances of this overall effort, exemplifying how strong the drive 
towards reduction is in economics. While reduction is by no means the only criterion that 
economists apply to theory evaluation, it is surely an important one and one shared by 
most economists. And while strategic management scholars are by no means similarly 
uniform with respect to reduction and reductionism, a number of strategic management 
scholars may, as I argue later, be seen as reductionists (e.g., Barney, 2001; Coff, 1999.; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003).6  
What Reductionism Is Not 
Reductionism has generated much heated controversy (Dupree, 1993; Jones, 2000), 
including controversy in strategic management. For example, Bourgeois (1984: 586) 
argued that “… reductionism eliminates much of the richness that characterizes the 
strategic management process” (the basis for this assertion remains, however, unclear). As 
the position here is the exact opposite ⎯ we need more reductionism in strategic 
                                                 
5 Although Elster’s (1989: 74) dictum that “[r]eduction is at the heart of progress in science,” would likely 
be accepted by many scientists and philosophers, I am not aware of any sustained theory of science 
discussions of reduction(ism) as (a) progress (strategy). 
6 It is very likely that disciplinary background plays an important role here, strategic management scholars 
with more of an economics background arguably being more disposed towards reductionism for disciplinary 
reasons than strategic management scholars with more of a sociology background. 
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management research to increase the richness of the field ⎯, it is advisable to be explicit 
about what reductionism does and does not entail.  It may be easiest to start with the latter. 
Reductionism is occasionally taken to imply a denial of the phenomenon of 
“emergence.” Whatever that may be in a broader disciplinary context, such a denial is not 
characteristic of reductionism in social science, including strategic management. 
Reductionism is fully compatible with acknowledging that unintended consequences take 
place, for example. Furthermore, reductionism in social science is sometimes taken to 
mean that the analyst must always make reference to the full set of concrete actions, 
preferences, beliefs, etc. of concrete agents when trying to explain a phenomenon on the 
social domain. Obviously, this is usually not feasible, first, because of the sheer number of 
interacting agents and the complexity of their interaction ⎯ a problem that is occasionally 
referred to as “Cournot’s Problem” (e.g., Davis, 2003)⎯ , and, second, because of limited 
access to the preferences and beliefs of the relevant agents. Whatever that may be,7 no 
such extreme reductionism is advocated here. 
Reductionism, Black Boxes, and Structures 
Although reductionism seeks to eschew explanatory black boxes in principle, 
sometimes a case can be made for some degree of black box explanation. Apart from 
obvious disciplinary reasons,8 the reason for allowing some black boxes to enter 
explanation is explanatory parsimony. As Lewis (1986: 214) explains, 
[a]ny particular event that we might wish to explain stands at the end of a long 
and complicated causal history. We might imagine a world where causal 
histories are short and simple; but in the world as we know it, the only question 
is whether they are infinite or merely enormous. 
Luckily, it is simply not always necessary to seek and perform “rock-bottom explanation” 
for an explanation to be valid. For example, the strategic management scholar who is 
cognizant of economics knows that under competitive conditions, decision-makers in 
firms only have a very limited feasible behavioural repertoire. If they do not choose an 
                                                 
7 As an objection to reductionism, the argument is a red herring: Cournot’s problem does not rule out the 
possibility of explaining in terms of tractable models.  
8 For example, most economists want to treat tastes as black boxes, because not doing so would take them 
into entirely unfamiliar psychological territory 
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element of this set, they will not survive. Thus, although there is no break with the 
ontological position that only individuals can choose, our strategic management scholar 
pragmatically recognizes that a structure (i.e., competitive conditions) can substitute in an 
explanatory sense for a much more complicated explanation involving individual action 
and interaction.9 However, being a proper reductionist, he knows that such a “structural” 
story is at best a reduced form explanation, that is, shorthand for something much more 
complicated. Economists and strategic management scholars perform somewhat related 
explanatory operations when they construct firm-level arguments. Thus, to involve the 
argument in an explanation that “a firm has a strategy” or “acts in a certain way” is, of 
course, shorthand for a complex set of underlying individual actions and interactions.  
Reductionism and Methodological Individualism  
In a social science context, reduction and reductionism is intimately associated with 
”methodological individualism.”10 Reductionism in social science implies methodological 
individualism. Methodological individualism defines, as it were, the limits to reduction in 
social science, because it implies that social science explanation can stop at the level of 
individuals. There is no need to proceed further down the explanatory ladder.11  
 In its strongest form, methodological individualism asserts that in explanations of 
social phenomena reference is allowed only to individuals, their properties and their 
(inter)actions. Thus, at no point in the explanation can reference be made to supra-
individual entities as in any way acting as causal agents. On this program, explaining, for 
example, “the strategy of a firm” must always involve making reference to the mental 
states of all relevant organizational stakeholders.12 Many (in fact, most) methodological 
                                                 
9 For related arguments, see Koppl and Langlois (1991) and Satz and Ferejohn (1994). Koppl and Langlois 
argue that the argument originates with the economist Fritz Machlup. 
10 See Udehn (2001) for a recent overview, or O’Neill (1973) for a compilation of key readings. 
11  Methodological individualists are often charged with the claim that their emphasis on the individual is 
arbitrary as one might as well take, for example, the ”selfish gene” as the fundamental unit. However, this 
argument commits the ”driver’s seat fallacy”, to wit, ”[g]enes build bodies. … Once the body is built, the 
genes have no control or influence on what those bodies do.  It makes no more sense to say that genes drive 
our thoughts and emotions than it does to say that genes pump our blood. Our heart pumps our blood and our 
brain drives our thoughts and emotions … Our genes are not in the driver’s seat, we are” (Markoczy and 
Goldberg, 1998: 390). 
12  Clearly, this program will often not be completely practicable for empirical reasons: It is usually 
impossible to obtain the necessary empirical information that is necessary to perform such a fine-grained 
explanation.   
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individualists do not espouse this strong form. For example, Agassi (1960) argues that 
reference to institutions, clearly a collective concept, can be permitted in social science 
explanation, and many methodological individualists would argue that reference to 
collective concepts is permissible, and sometimes necessary as a sort of explanatory short-
hand. In the context of strategic management, the collective concept of (firm-level) 
capabilities may be invoked as a handy explanatory shorthand. However, all 
methodological individualists insist that ultimately collective phenomena must be reduced 
to and explained in terms of individuals, that is, individual endowments, intentions, 
desires, expectations, and goals (cf. Hayek, 1955; Elster, 1989). Thus, the methodological 
individualist strategy scholar will be sceptical of the use of the notion of capabilities until 
the individual level foundations of this concept have been clarified.13  
In contrast, methodological collectivism starts from the assumption that collectives 
are somehow independent from individuals and can therefore be taken as “primitives” in 
social science explanation. That is, collectives such as organizations, and “social facts” 
such as institutions, culture and capabilities serve as the primary independent variables 
determining individual and collective behaviour and outcomes (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 
1991: 8). The argument is that structure and institutions are prior to individuals in 
influencing (and even determining) choice sets and behaviour. In general, individual-level 
explanation is rejected in favour of collective explanation. 
In terms of the earlier emphasis on opening up black boxes and uncovering causal 
mechanisms, it is clear that methodological individualists and methodological collectivists 
differ strongly with respect to which boxes need to be opened and which mechanisms 
deserve emphasis, and perhaps even which mechanisms exist. In other words, ontological 
positions are very likely to accompany methodological positions. Thus, a hardcore 
methodological individualist (if such exist) will deny any top-down causation and insist 
that all that matters is bottom-up causation (i.e., from individuals to collectives). A 
moderate methodological individualist may accept that at least metaphorically (cf. the 
earlier notion of explanatory shorthand) institutions exert influence on individual 
                                                 
13 Will he accept that capabilities exist? As I see it, the methodological individualist strategic management 
scholar may admit ontological status to capabilities in the sense that acknowledging that capabilities 
describe patterns of specialization and co-specialization of firm members’ knowledge and actions that are 
specific to a given firm. As Felin and Hesterly (2007) notes such an argument is espoused in, for example, 
the view that organizations are “strong situations” (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989).  
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behaviour, for example, in the sense that “they” structure incentives and therefore impact 
behaviour (Boudon, 1998). Hardcore collectivists (if such exist) may argue that causal 
relations that operate wholly on the collective level have real existence and are not just 
explanatory shorthand.  
THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: 
OSCILLATING BETWEEN MICRO AND MACRO 
The Swinging Strategic Management Pendulum 
In a magisterial paper Hoskisson et al. (1999) surveyed two decades of research in 
strategic management and likened the evolution of the field to a swinging pendulum. 
Whereas early work emphasized rich case description of individual firms and individual 
managers’ behaviors, around 1980 there was a move away from this inside perspective 
towards more of an outside perspective, based on industrial economics and strongly 
emphasizing cross-sectional work and a general quest for generalization. Without 
dropping these ambitions, work on strategic groups, competitive dynamics, and boundary 
relationships between firms began to swing the pendulum back towards more of an 
internal focus as the 1980s progressed. The strong emphasis on transaction costs 
economics (Williamson, 1985) in the mid- to the end of the 1980s signified an 
intermediate position of the pendulum.  The rise of the resource-based view towards the 
end of the 1980s swung the pendulum fully back towards an emphasis on the internal 
aspects of firms, and arguably a more eclectic approach to empirical research.  
The swinging pendulum thesis is not a normative device; it is purely a device 
constructed for the purpose of historical reconstruction, and for demonstrating how 
changing theories imply different empirical research methods.  To the extent that a view 
on progress in strategic management is present in the Hoskisson et al. (1999) piece, 
progress is a matter of being better able to cope with problems, old and new (e.g., 
globalization), integration of diverse perspectives, and more rigorous empirical techniques 
(see also Hitt et al., 1998). In fact, the issue of scientific progress is seldom addressed in 
the strategic management field, although some early papers highlighted it (Camerer, 1985; 
Balakrishnan et al., 1989). In contrast, the issue is directly confronted in the following, 
making use of a variation on the swinging pendulum thesis.  
Scientific Progress in the Strategic Management Field 
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So, has the strategic management field made scientific progress? Obviously, how 
that question is answered depends on which criteria are applied and even on how these 
criteria are interpreted. On the basis of criteria essentially borrowed from economics and 
the growth of knowledge literature, Camerer (1985) concluded that strategic management 
research had not made any substantial theoretical progress. In developing prescriptions for 
research, he stressed conventionalist criteria such as the “coherence” of the theoretical 
structure, and in general put forward a strong advocacy for the position that “ … deductive 
use of mathematics and economic concepts is the best way to answer (and ask) corporate 
strategy questions” (1985: 1). Mahoney (1993) argued that the alleged “coherence” may 
effectively translate into suppressing (necessary) diversity. On the basis of what seems to 
be an instrumentalist criterion Arend (2003: 283) argued that “If …a science is defined by 
an ability to predict and control the dependent variables of interest then strategy research 
cannot ultimately fare well. Perhaps a new definition is needed to provide a fairer measure 
of progress in strategy research.” While Arend may pass unnecessarily harsh judgment, 
the argument here is that his call for new criteria for assessing scientific progress in the 
strategic management is well taken. One such new criterion is analytical reduction, as has 
just been suggested.  
Levels of Analysis 
As Hackman (2003: 905) notes, “[r]egardless of the level of analysis at which we 
begin, we like to move to the next level for our explanations.” For the practising social 
scientist that level, Hackman explains by means of examples, typically lies lower down, 
not up.14 However, it is not the case that the strategic management field has exhibited a 
natural tendency to adopt increasingly reductionist or micro-oriented explanations. On the 
contrary, the field has, taken as a whole demonstrated a preference for supra-individual 
levels of analysis, whether capabilities/competencies/core competencies/dynamic 
capabilities, firm, group, or industry levels.  Of course, there is nothing surprising in this, 
given that the key dependent variables in strategic management research have typically 
been located at the firm level. However, to work at levels of analysis that are higher than 
that of the individual does not, of course, rule out the need for establishing micro-
                                                 
14 Hackman, however, comes out in favour of a strategy of temporarily “bracketing” the focal level of 
analysis and focusing attention on the level immediately below and immediately above this level to gain 
increased understanding 
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foundations for such aggregate work (i.e., the analytical convenience or necessity of 
supra-individual levels of analysis does not make obviate micro-foundations). However, 
the efforts to build explicit micro-foundations have been very few. Therefore, there have 
also been very few attempts to seriously reconcile micro and macro-levels,15 in spite of 
much recent attention being paid to “levels issues,” “multiple level analysis” and the like 
in management in general (e.g., Klein et al., 1994; Felin and Hesterly, 2007) .  
There are various reasons why this sort of inquiry has so far been largely absent 
from strategic management. At the most basic level, strategic management is still a young 
field: No or few fields begin in a multi-level mode and in social science micro-foundations 
do not necessarily come first.16 Another reason is that in an inherently applied and 
practical discipline, implicit consensus may arise that issues of micro-foundations and of 
bridging levels are best left at the level of the base disciplines (e.g., psychology, 
economics, sociology inquiry. A third possible reason is that strategic management may 
be inherently pluralistic (Mahoney 1993; Mahoney and Pandian 1993) and this precludes 
building specific micro-foundations (Felin and Foss 2005). Whatever all that may be, 
strategic management has usually been characterized by collective level theorizing (see 
also Felin and Hesterly 2005), as will be discussed next.   
Strategic Management in the Aggregate Mode 
Hoskisson et al. (1998) note ⎯ correctly ⎯ that strategy thinking began with case 
studies of single firms and an emphasis on the general manager. However, as an analytical 
enterprise, strategic management rather began in a more aggregate mode. Early thinking 
(beginning of the 1970s) coming out of the Boston Consulting Group stressed firm-level 
learning curve advantages with no attention being paid to the underlying intra-
organizational generative processes of individual action and interaction that are ultimately 
responsible for the learning-curve phenomenon. Research inspired by the Profit Impact of 
Market Strategy project begun in the mid-nineteen sixties at General Electric and 
expanded upon by the Management Institute at Harvard from the beginning of the 1970s 
                                                 
15 Usually, the industry and the firm levels are “aligned” through application of the SWOT framework, the 
SW representing the firm level and the OT the industry level. For a forceful critique of the soundness of this, 
see Makadok (2005). 
16 Even economics began in the aggregate mode. Explicit microeconomics only really arrived with the 
marginalist revolution(s) of the 1870s, that is, about a hundred years after Adam Smith’s classic (and two 
hundred years after William Petty).  
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entailed a search for reduced form correlations between profit variables and various 
potential independent variables that defined an aggregative style of theorizing that is still 
very much present in the field. The focus of the PIMS project arguably also helped to pave 
the way for the field’s perhaps first serious analytical breakthrough, namely Porter’s 
(1980) industry analysis/positioning approach.   
Transferring industrial organization economics to the strategy field, Porter’s 
approach placed literally all of the explanatory burden on the aggregate characteristics of 
the environment, as captured in the famous “5 forces.” The firm as has so often been 
observed is completely blackboxed in this approach. Managers are mentioned, but only as 
the agents that have to carry out the analysis of industries and position the firm in the 
chosen industries. Their skills at doing this are presumably the main source of competitive 
advantage. Of course, as a practising economist Porter cannot be expected to have any 
particular sympathy for methodological collectivism. And his industry analysis does not 
harbour any ontological pretensions with respect to the existence of industries as anything 
other but producers that recognize that their products are close or relatively close 
substitutes. Indeed, as Porter (1980) himself stresses, the five forces approach used as a 
strategic tool is first and foremost a first cut at organizing information of relevance to the 
firm. While starting from this cut, more sophisticated strategic analysis must deal with 
strategic groups and mobility barriers, with pricing tactics, and the like.   
In fact, later strategic management work that builds from industrial organization 
economics has typically dealt with exactly these kind of more fine-grained issues. As a 
result, some of the somewhat fuzzy collective categories that loom so large in Porter’s 
early work disappear. Thus, instead of anonymous “forces” now come well-specified 
cooperative and non-cooperative games with (respectively) 
buyers/suppliers/complementors and competitors (Ghemawat, 1998; Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996) where the players are clearly identified, and ⎯ at least in the case of non-
cooperative games ⎯ their interaction is explicitly modelled. The case of the Porter 
approach nicely illustrates how an aggregative approach that places all of the 
informational burden on the analytical level immediately above the focal firm sacrifices 
informational content. Thus, the industry analysis/positioning has nothing in itself to say 
about firm-level competitive advantage.  
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Towards Micro – and Back to Collectives and Collectivism 
The RBV has very often been portrayed as an approach that supplied the missing 
pieces, specifically the analysis of (firm-level) competitive advantage,17 by taking an 
explicit focus on the resources that firms control. It is often informally seen as an instance 
of scientific progress because it treated a hitherto untheorized set of mechanisms, that is, 
the links from resources to competitive advantage and in turn to performance. The other 
side of that coin is that the RBV was reductionist in the sense that it literally dug deeper 
than rival perspectives by placing the primary explanatory burden on the resources 
controlled by a firm rather than on industry structure and competitive interaction. The 
individual resource would, at least on first inspection, seem to lie on a substantially lower 
level of analysis than the industry, the group or the firm. Thus, the RBV would seem to be 
well suited to exploring, for example, how individual employees contribute to value 
creation and how created value is distributed as a result of bargaining processes among the 
various stakeholders whose cooperation takes place under the legal shell represented by 
the firm (Wernerfelt, 1989). This potential for micro-analysis was, however, sidetracked 
for a long time, until the important recent work of Coff (1999) and Lippman and Rumelt 
(2003a&b).   
It is quite arguable that one of the reasons why the RBV gained so much success is 
exactly the feature of digging deeper. Not only may this has been recognized as an 
independent achievement (as the above suggests that indeed it should), but it also had the 
advantage of bringing the view in contact with organizational theory (in a broad sense, 
including organizational economics and organizational behaviour), human resource 
management, research on ICT and much other strategically relevant research that was hard 
to link to the more aggregative Porter approach.   
However, as time unfolded, several things happened that implied that strategic 
management did not really fully release the potential for micro-analysis that the advent of 
the RBV signalled. First, standard definitions of a “resource” did not take an explicit 
micro-perspective. Thus, Barney (1991) defined a resource in a rather inclusive manner as 
“anything that may be thought of as an advantage to a firm.” Clearly, this might 
conceivably encompass organization-level, collective resources, such as capabilities, 
                                                 
17 Such a reading stresses (positive) complementarity between the Porter approach and the RBV. That this 
reading may be inconsistent is forcefully argued by Makadok (2005).  
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culture and the like. Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) extremely influential analysis was widely 
interpreted as implying that “stand-alone” resources acquired on strategic factor markets 
could not in general be expected to give rise to competitive advantage simply because they 
were traded. Whatever we may think of the soundness of this conclusion (and for the 
contrary view, see Barney, 1986 and more Denrell, Fang and Winter, 2003), the perceived 
force of its logic directed attention to “socially complex,” “collectively held” resources, 
such as the “core competencies” or “capabilities” that were gaining currency in the 
beginning of the 1990s.18   
There was a move back to the collective level, as strategy scholars increasingly 
converged on organizational capabilities as a key construct (Eisenhardt and Martin, 1999; 
Winter, 2003). Indeed, the organizational capabilities approach may now be the 
predominant way of thinking about heterogeneity in strategic management. Sustained 
competitive advantage, a firm-level phenomenon, is now directly explained in terms of 
capabilities, competencies, etc., that is, in terms of other firm-level phenomena. This is 
methodological collectivism (Felin and Foss, 2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2007). 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Although it has been claimed that the degree of reflexivity in strategic management is low 
(Pettigrew et al., 2002: 9, 11), methodological reflection has actually been part of the field 
almost since its inception (e.g., Bowman, 1974). A theory of science based chapter was 
part of the seminal Schendel and Hofer (1979) collection of essays (i.e., Spender, 1979). 
Methodology papers have continuously appeared in the Strategic Management Journal. In 
addition, strategic management scholars are (as is the case of most practicising scientists) 
active implicit theorists of science, making essentially methodological comments and 
observations on existing work in the field. In terms of the trends of methodological 
discourse in strategic management, early work was clearly under the influence of the 
growth of knowledge literature (particularly Balakrishnan et al., 1989), but current 
methodological work makes a rather pluralistic impression, ranging from constructivism 
to the application of formal logic.  
                                                 
18 At the AoM meetings in 2004 at which Felin and Foss (2005) was presented, several members of the 
audience argued that the emphasis in that paper on micro-foundations were not relevant to strategic analysis, 
because all sustainable heterogeneity was located at the collective level. 
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Whereas the normative aspect of the methodological enterprise has been somewhat 
toned down in recent writings this chapter has introduced a perspective that 1) is common-
sense, 2) is novel, and 3) may capture important aspects of the practice of strategic 
management research. Thus, the argument has been that reduction may instantiate 
scientific progress, and that important parts of the evolution of the strategic management 
field can be understood as a quest for identifying the deep structure of competitive 
advantage.  Although the pendulum has shifted back and forth between macro and micro 
perspectives, currently staying on the macro side (i.e., the capabilities perspective) there 
are signs that more micro perspectives are making themselves felt. Thus, increasingly 
strategy scholars emphasize that value creation may have an important individual level 
component (Felin and Hesterly, 2007) and that individuals appropriate (Coff, 1997, 1999) 
through complex interaction (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). The recent strong emphasis 
on entrepreneurship in the field seems to indicate a similar move towards foundations 
rooted in the actions and interaction of individuals. In terms of the methodological 
perspective developed in this paper, this tendency is a distinct example of progress.  
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